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Book Reviews
American Poets from tbe Puritans to the Present by Hyatt H. Waggoner. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968. Pp. xxi + 740. $8.50.
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This is a fighting book, a polemical history of American verse. Its purpose is
to reclaim our poetry from the dominance of the Modernist movement organized
by Pound and Eliot, which, 1\1r. Waggoner feels, has, through the influence of
its poets and their admiring critics, all but submerged the genuine American
tradition based on the philosophy of Emerson. As a result we nowadays don't
even read Qur nineteenth century poets aright, nor do we recognize the real
lineage of our best poets.
As onc who long has felt that the center of gravity in American poetry is
surely Emerson's essay. "The Poct," I'm prepared to go along with that. Yet
I find I can't keep Mr. Waggoner's argument company all the way. Hyatt Waggoner, who has written one of the most sensitive and comprehending studies of
Hawthorne which that much-maligned author has received, is the author also of
an earlier study of modern poets. I confess not to have read The Heel of Elobim,
but would cite its subtitle as indicative of one of Mr. Waggoner's abiding
interests and as a clue to his method of approaching poetry. He calls his earlier
book Science and Values in Modern American Poetry. Now, relying heavily on
W. T. Stace's Religion and the Modern World, Mr. Waggoner mounts a counterattack against the incorporation, as it seems, of scientific assumptions into the
methods and attitudes of poetry. Poets nowadays seem guilty of what Emerson
deplored in his contemporaries: "Men seem to have lost the perception of the
instant dependence of form upon soul" (an apothegm of RWE's which Mr.
Waggoner does not quote). l\10dern poets who have tried to replace transcendental affirmation with objectivism, imagism, or any other means of dealing
with" No ideas but in things" seem to Mr. Waggoner to have traduced poetry
from its necessary humanism and to have reduced it to a mechanistic craft.
His own center of certitude leads Mr. Waggoner to provide a full-scale
scholarly justification for the recent movements in modern poetry which disavow
the Elder Statesmen. It leads him also to revise the usual estimate of priorities
and accomplishments in the earlier centuries of the meager annals of American
verse. For Mr. Waggoner is so solidly in the transcendentalist camp that he
does not view with sympathy the Puritan belief against which Emerson & Co.
rebelled. If Ann Bradstreet and Edward Taylor could believe in Puritanism, so
much the worse for them. Mr. Waggoner finds Puritan theology inhuman and
pathological. Who in his right mind would accept such tenets as infant damnation and the election only of a few chosen aforetimes by a God too brutal to
let us know His will? Analyzing the much-praised metaphysical strain in Taylor'S
poems, Mr. Waggoner finds our Puritan poet, with his metaphors mixed and
self-contradicting, a poor pupil of George Herbert, "hardly worth reading
except as an anticipator of Emerson.
The chapter on the five New England greybeards will not tempt anyone to
l)
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delve into Bryant, Holmes Of Longfellow (whose sonnets don't rate mention),
but Mr. vVaggoner makes a case, among Lowell's many prolix and ambitious
failures, for" Fitz-Adam's Story," and argues convincingly in favor of Whittier's
"Snowbound." He rightly concludes that these once-revered worthies "failed
by the tests provided in Emerson's 'The Poet ': America was not a poem in
their eyes."
Emerson's seminal value is found to reside in his "thought," particularly in
"The Poet" and in "Circles." By page 94 we come close to the heart, or
jugular vein, of Mr. Waggoner's argument:
What are the typical American poems? . . . there would at least be
nothing essentially misleading in naming as typical "Uriel," "Song of
J\1yself," Dicldnson's « Like Rain it Sounded Till it Curved," "The Man
Against the Sky," "Kitty Hawk," "Sunday Morning," and "The
Bridge." What they have in common . • . despite their stylistic and
formal differences, is that none of them can be understood except in
religious terms. They are all eschatological poems.
Wr. Waggoner asserts that the chief difference between American and British
poetry is "that American poets have tended to think of poetry as prophecy, not
as the practice of an art whose rules were known, and not as a way of thinking
about a fixed and known' reality.'" (p. 85.) TIns sentiment might surprise Blake
or Shelley or Yeats, but they are of course the British founders of the symbolist
movement whose prophecies invoke other religions than the Emersonian. Whitman, who thought of Leaves of Grass as "essentially a language experiment"
(among his other ways of thinking of it) is here discussed as thinker rather than
as poet. There are valuable chapters on the Emersonian strains in the poems of
Thoreau and Dickinson, but the claims made for i\1:elville's verse by Matthiessen
and Parrell (Mr. Waggoner does not mention Robert Penn Warren) seem" a
judgment chiefly valuable for the way it illustrates the occasional fallibility of
even the finest critics." This judgment is substantiated by a few pages on the
flatness of Clare!; but surely if there were one poem written in the American
nineteenth century which speaks with painful clarity of our condition now it is
Melville's "The House-Top." \Vhich 1\Ilr. Waggoner doesn't mention, nor
would he probably agree with either my high evaluation or Melville's pessemistic
view of an American city torn by civil strife "In code corroborating Calvin's
creed."

If the foregoing summary of Mr. Waggoner's argument has perpetrated no
serious distortion of his views, several inferences may be drawn from my account
of the first half of his book. First, it will be seen that the center of power in
Tbe American Poets is Emerson as a religious thinker. Those poets who failed
to anticipate or to carryon Emerson's tradition of insight into the spiritual core
of life, of which nature is the continuing revelation, are knocked down from
the plinths and pedestals to which less transcendental readers have assigned them.
Thus I construe the emphasis on the article in The American Poets.
Second, this is a one-tradition book, and that tradition is American. There's
no systematic or extended comparison of our nineteenth-century poets with
their Romantic or Victorian contemporaries. A not fully articulated premise
is that the internationalism of Pound and Eliot is a negligible contribution to
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Tbe American tradition which Mr. Waggoner upholds, although it had been
predicted by Bryant in 1825, who maintained that American poets, unburdened
by the weight of their own national traditions, would freely adopt and adapt
the myths, legends, and conventions of the literatures of other lands (" On
Poetry in Its Relation to OUI Age and Country").
And finally, The American Poets is more concerned with Poets than with
poems, more with their attitude to life than with the ways those attitudes are
enacted into poetry. This is a heartily Emersonian bias, regarding the Poet as
Seer and Sayer rather than as a Maker. Consequently Mr. Waggoner can find
evidence just as useful for his inquiry in poems of slight merit as in masterpieces. Indeed works artistically defective may prove more useful to such an
investigation, laying bare, as they do, the assumptions on which they are made.
Mr. Waggoner, while valuably directing us to read Emerson's rarely reprinted
early poems, can compare to Frost's "Sand Dunes" and to Eliot's "Dry Salvages" so banal a poem as Emerson's "Water"-he calls it "interesting and
memorable," but I find it hard to take seriously a poem on a serious subject
which uses such dull light rhymes as "It wets my foot but prettily, I It chills
my life, but wittily," or which migles conversational verb forms with" decketh,"
"adorneth, doubleth," and chimes cliche with cliche. The Whitman chapter
rests on an exegesis of "To Think of Time," a poem which, Mr. Waggoner
admits, "no one else has ever claimed as one of VVhitman's best, though it seems
to me so, because parts of it put so baldly the rationale of Whitman's celebration
of the self, himself and every self, and of life in all its variety and promise"
(p. 168). This would be defensible were there no such evidence available in a
dozen, a score of other poems such as "Song of Myself," "The Sleepers," etc.,
etc., whose expression is intrinsic with their thought. Mr. Waggoner's critical
method would seem to detect little, if any, difference in content between the
poem that succeeds and the poem that fails. To critics of a:p.other persuasion,
however, as to many of the poets whose work is here discussed, form, rhythm,
diction, and tone are equally as important as subject and metaphor in determining-indeed, in predicating-any II meaning" which may be paraphrased from the
total poetic statement. Such terms as the foregoing, though are not the usual
ones in Mr. Waggoner's critical canon; the shot and powder with which he is
armed more usually comes from terms like "eschatalogical vision," 41 teleology,"
and "scientificism."
Curiously, I find myself thinking of another critic whose eccentricities of taste
Mr. Waggoner rightly deplores. Like Yvor Winters, Hyatt Waggoner is a
moralist. Therefore the verse and criticism of those who, like Poe, propose that
the poem has no other end than its own perfection, or-less dogmatically-that
aesthetic standards must determine the relevance of aesthetic works, seem to
him either trivial or mischievous. Although committed to an entirely different
aesthetic, The American Poets is in its monism comparable also to another earlier
study of American writing; like Parrington's Main Currents of American
Thought, the present book excludes currents not deemed to be in the mainstream.
Which, as Lionel Trilling made clear about Parrington, leads to claims too large,
one-sided, and unconte§ited. The whole symbolist tradition is missing from Mr.
Waggoner's view, although a good case has been made by Charles FeideIson
(among others) for Emerson's relevance to that tradition in America. Rejected
is not only Poe's aesthetic, which demanded the repudiation of reality in order
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to provide in its stead the created reality of the imagination, but also the more
humane and inclusive idealism of Santayana (scarcely mentioned) 1 who proposed
that all of reality is the material upon which "the significant imagination"
performs its work of analytical transformation.
Fully half of this book deals with poetry since 1912. Mr. Waggoner discovers in Imagism the great betrayal of the Transcendentalist-Romantic movement. "Imagism," he says, "grew out of scientific positivism" (p. 336).
The idea of man implicit in such poetic theory is the materialist one
that he is like the Pavlovian dog ,,,hose mouth waters when a bell rings.
Whether we call Imagist-Impersonal poetic theory "Bchavorist" or
"mechanist-materialist" or "positivist," it is clear that this earlier poetics
of Modernism was not philosophically neutral. . . .
Imagism was the first phase of a literary moyement characterized ultimately by themes of alienation, by insistence on denial of responsibility,
by the preference for the "anti-hero "-Prufrock, Senlin-ano finally,
when philosophy and theology, as popularly known, had caught up with
Pound's early poetics, by despair and emptiness. Imagism is the poetic
equivalent of fictional naturalism. (Pages 339-40.)
"Behavorist"? "Positivism"? "Naturalism"? Do these pejorations really
describe the poetics that produced H. D.'s little poem about the shapes of pears?
The true center of Mr. \Vaggoncr's animus against Imagism is not so much these
pseudo-scientific asseverations made by some of the Imagists but "themes of
alienation ... denial of responsibility ... despair and emptiness." NIr. Waggoner
repudiates not only the poetics of the Modernist movement but the breaking
do\vn in our culture of all the cenainties which Emerson proposed a century
ago. Yet in proposing them, Emerson found he had to strip away the dead
husks, the encrustation of custom by which society kept each man from recognizing the sources of his o\vn manhood. Fighting the old battlc of the religious
sensibility against the menace of scientific positivism, .Mr. Waggoner seems to
me to regard as agents of the enemy many of the poets who in fact demonstrate
the continuing resilience of Emerson's radical indiyidualism.
Who, after all, does belong under Emerson's banner? Suppose we consider
Emerson not only as a Seer with an "eschatological vision" but also as a
theorist for the Makers. Suppose we place RWE at the center of a somewhat
different circle from the one which Mr. Waggoner draws around the body of
his beliefs. For in "The Pact" and in the section on language in "Nature,"
Emerson utters the American counterpan to the call sounded forty years earlier
in The LY1'ical Ballads to rescue the diction and the forms of poetry from
mechanism, cliche, stale habit. This is the ongoing renewal of the art which
must be made in each generation, by each poet, lest the forms and language of
verse become no longer capable of expressing or eliciting the actual responses of
men: exactly the condition of poetry around 1910, as it was in Emerson's and
Whitman's day.
When Walt admitted that it was Emerson who brought his seethings to a
boil, what his turbulent chowder-kettle contained was not only a form of
Emerson's philosophy transmogrified into his own, but the sudden imaginative
capacity to enact in poems Emerson's philosophy of form. Why it was that
Emerson the poet is S9 little the achiever of what Emerson the Seer predicated
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for the poet to do is one of the mysteries at the center of the ever-revolving
circles of Emerson's being. Was it the inbred constraint of his Puritan-Unitarian
heritage? Or an inescapable fealty to genteel conventions associated with the
High Calling of the Seer? Somehow, despite the radical and seminal nature of
his thought, in the diction and form of most of his poems Emerson lacked the
afflatus to become the Litcratus which his O\Vll philosophy of emancipation from
tradition in fact demanded. His disciple is Walt the plebe, the queer, the
poseur, "one of the toughs, of lVIanahatta the son," a nonconformist by birthright, repudiating America's norms but best expressing her hitherto unsung hopes.
What a strange enactment of Emerson's lofty prophecies.
But from Whitman's unconstraint came the radical breakup of form and
meter, the true discovery of how to use the vernacular diction in poetry (anticipated by R\VE in the first part of "Hamatreya," alas an anomaly among his
"wer'ts" and" dosts"). What is more, Whitman discovered too how to reconstitute in organic forms the obsolete kinds of form he repudiated. In his steps
I'd place Ezra, who indeed made "A Pact" with Whitman, and the whole
experimental tradition of Modernism. The same fire brought their seethings to a
boil. 1. e.: Cummings, whose attitude to life Mr. Waggoner valuably elucidates
as Emersonian, is Emersonian too in his radical linguistic pri~nitivism-his rejection of conventional encrustations of meaning attached to the very forms and
meters of verse, the very words of the language-and in his need to reconstitute
a language directly in contact with experience.
That need is the essential motive of the entire Modernist movement: the need
for emotional honesty, for the proofs of being in direct touch with life, as expressed in diction, forms, rhythms intrinsic with what is experienced; a rejection
of that part of the past which like a shell on our backs keeps OUt the realities
we might otherwise feel and say. If Pound and Eliot adopted a mechanistic
vocabulary and called for poetry to be as well-written as prose, it was because
the poetry of the time was loosely ill-written, and science could be invoked
polemically as a call-really, a recall-to accuracy of observation. Williams'
slogan, "No ideas but in things," does not mean no ideas at all, as Mr. Waggoner
seems to infer, but suggests that things do represent ideas. What else could
Pound have been thinking of in his famous definition of an image as "that
which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time"?
"The natural object," Pound added, "is always the adequate symbol. Go in fear
of abstractions." If only Pound had done so, in matters historical, economic,
and political! As for the Imagism which Pound helped to define, Mr. Waggoner
regards as the arch-enemy of idealism a brief movement which was in fact a
stage in the development of technique, shared for a few years by poets as disparate as Pound, Eliot, H. D., Williams, Stevens, and Marianne Moore. Mr. Waggoner seems to me to quite misread the true temper of Marianne Moore's poetry,
for he parses her one poem "Poetry" and finds her "positivistic and antiidealistic." Yet who is more Emersonian in her rectitude and emotional honesty?
It seems a mistake to deny "any cognitive function to the imagination" in the
work of the poet who has given us our most believable and ethically valid modern
bestiary, who praised "Spenser's Ireland," "A Carriage Built in Sweden," and
wrote "The mind is an enchanting thing." Each of the Imagists learned from
Imagism to write economically, to control rhythms freed from formal meters,
to organize perceptions without stuffing them into predetermined fODDs. Isn't
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this the organic form of the meter-making argument for which Emerson sounded
his noble trumpet eighty years earlier? These lessons learned, each quondam
Imagist went his own way. To hold that these poets deprived modern literature
of the quest for spiritual meaning seems to me to misconstrue their individual
voyages after strange gods as well as back to the familiar.
In his preface Mr. Waggoner disarmingly confesses that as his book programmed itself it required that he relinquish the chance to comment on some
of his favorite poets-among whom I am glad indeed to find my own name
mentioned. Yet some of the omissions arc surprising. Of all contemporary poets
the one whose work would seem best to demonstrate the Emersoruan position,
with all its risks and strengths, is Richard Eberhart; yet he too is among the
regretted exclusions. In fact as the historical survey comes down to our own
rime, the tradition here seems spotty and idiosyncratic. The last chapter, "After
Modernism," briefly discusses Roethke (very perceptively), Lowell, Shapiro, and
Wilbur-the masters of the middle generation; and still briefer comment on
James Dickey, Howard Nemerov, Robert Kelley (in two contexts), Robert
Duncan, Denise Levertov, Robert Creeley. In a work of over 700 pages, which
gives space to Sara Teasdalc, Elinore Wylie, James Gould Fletcher and Amy
Lowell, there is no mention made of such significant contemporaries as John
Berryman, Charles Olson, Allen Ginsberg, W. S. Merwin, Anthony Hecht.
"The price I have paid for trying to illuminate the main lines of the development of American poetry by concentrating on lengthy treatment of 'representative poets,''' Mr. Waggoner writes, "is in not being able to talk about some of
the poetry that means most to me personally. But perhaps another time,
another book." Let's hope so. For Hyatt Waggoner, however much I have
differed w.ith his emphasis and approach, is a concerned advocate of our literature who writes with vigor and passion out of his own convictions. I am grateful
for a book which so energetically arraigns the acceptance of the Modernist
masters and so sternly argues for virtues long out of fashion. Whether we agree
with Mr. Waggoner or not, The American Poets compels us thoughtfully to
reconsider our poetic heritage. This is a considerable accomplishment.
DANIEL HOFFMAN

University of Pennsylvania

Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Poet as Victorian by Wendell Stacy Johnson.
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. xii 178. $6.95.

+

Although the dates of his birth and death-1844-1889-fall within the Victorian
period, the predominant attitude of critics toward Hopkins aftcr the first edition
of his poems in 1918 was that he was almost completely non-Victorian. They
tended to see Hopkins either as one of their own contemporaries in the forefront of modern poetry or as a throwback to some pre-Chaucerian era.
It was not until the centenary of his birth in 1944 that Arthur Mizener contributed to the Kenyon symposium an essay entitled "Victorian Hopkins," and
that Austin Warren suggested his roots in nineteenth century England. W. H.
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Gardner's two-volume study, written about the same time, attempted to find a.
balance which is suggested by its subtide, Gerard Mlmley Hopkins: A Study of
Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tradition.
Some recent criticism has emphasized nineteenth century aspects of Hopkins.
Todd K. Bender in his Gerard Mlmley Hopkins: The Classical Background and
Critical Reception of His Work (The Johus Hopkins Press, 1966) has con·
tended that many of Hopldns' methods had their origin in his training as a
19th century classical scholar. And Elisabetb Schneider in an article in PMLA
(1965), recendy revised as a chapter in her The Dragon in the Gate: Studies
in the Poetry of G. M. Hopkins (University of California Press, 1968), has related
his sprung rhythm to Victorian prosodic and metrical experiments.
However, Wendell Stacy Johnson, convinced that one of the most significant
contexts of Hopkins' art is Victorian, has contributed an entirely new and fresh
approach to the examination of Hopkins as a poet of his time.
This he does by attempting a new definition or description of the very term
"Victorian." Rejecting previous formulations as relatively superficial (i. e.
imperialism, hypocricy, optimism, etc.) he seeks to find the essence of Victorianism as differentiated both from Romanticism and from the spirit of the twentieth
century.
The paradoxical unity of Victorianism, he holds, lies fundamentally in a feel·
ing of intense self-consciousness, of almost simultaneous self-probing and selfmasking, and in a newly ambivalent relationship of that self-consciousness to
nature, a new relation of ego and image or of self and nature embodied in the
writer's imagery. Within the Victorian intelligence and sensibility there is implied an uneasy duality, irony, and doubt, an anxious mood of introspection and
uncertainty, a condition characterized by Arnold as the II dialogue of the mind
with itself." A result is an alienation of the artist not only from society but
from himself.
This Victorian self-consciousness is different, Johnson suggests, from that
of the Romantics who attained an hannonious interaction with nature and from
that of the modems who, instead of trying to discover themselves, try "to create
themselves."
Hopkins' emphasis on inscape, then, is his effort to come to terms with
this self-consciousness by controlling doubleness and ambiguity. From this point
of view Hopkins is preoccupied with the post-Romantic problems which haunt
Victorian writers as he probes the relation-or alienation-of self and external
nature.
Mter this prelude, the balance of the book is devoted to examining the
imagery of four (thougb many others are treated incidentally) centrally important poems by Hopkins that explore the relation of self to nature.
"The Wreck of the Deutschland," combining introspective manner with dramatic matter, is seen as opposing active nature to self. At the center is an ambivalent response in which the sea of death is the sea of life and death is a
means to a fuller life.
II The Windhover"
develops a parallel between active nature and self. Inviting ambivalent responses, the arch-pattern of self is revealed through selfsacrifice.
The third poem treated is "Spring and Fall" where the parallel is between
passive nature and self and where Johnson also deals with the Victorian con-
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sciOllsness of time, a subject recendy explored by Jerome H. Buckley (The
Triumph of Time, Cambridge, Mass., 1966). In "Spring and Fall" the child of
the Romantics has become more victim than visionary.
Finally, "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire," opposing passive nature to
transfiguration, asserts human immortality by shifting from a natural imagery
of brilliant light to a metaphorical imagery of transcendent light. The poem
is the climax of the dappled imagery of light and darkness or the simultaneous
perception of night and day ubiquitous in Hopkins.
Haplrins' response in the body of his work to questions about man and
nature makes him Victorian. In spite of paradoxical complexities and ambiguities, Johnson finds him more coherent and consistent than other Victorians. The
range of his experience and thought may be limited but Johnson concludes
that It his art is as intense as it is narrow or concentrated."
It always seems niggling for a reviewer to collect proof errors, and such
oversights in the book as that of referring to the windhover who "makes an
are" are not disturbing. One is more perturbed when slips appear in supporting
quotations from Hopkins as when" my taste was me" becomes II my taste [be}
rue," or when" shipwrack" in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" becomes" shipwreck," or when "havens" in "Heaven-Haven" becomes II heavens." And
one doubts whether the rhythm and sense are improved by dropping Hopkins'
markings in "Margaret" in II Spring and Fall" and by deleting the diacritical
mark in "hoiirs" in one of the Dublin sonnets.
As one looks back over the book one realizes that Johnson will be subject to
attack on two major fronts.
Many a scholar will challenge his definition of Victorianism as either too
broad or too narrow. If it is too broad it is because it can be manipulated to
include many writers or works that no one has ever thought-or even would
think of-as Victorian. On the other hand, if it is too narrow it excludes many
characteristics that differentiate Victorian writers from those of other periods.
Eventually the only way it can be tested is by careful application to all the
works of all the Victorians, and this would take a whole generation of scholars.
Certainly with Hopkins it works much better with some poems than with
others, and one cannot help admiring Johnson for choosing not to take the easy
way out by concentrating on the Dublin sonnets which are probably the best
illustration of his thesis. With the poems which he does treat he handles his
definition with sophistication and-in spite of some straining-with a great deal
of wide-ranging flexibility. As I interpret him, he does not mean to deny that
in Hopkins there are other (though he would say more superficial) Victorian
elements nor that there are aspects in which Hopkins is something other than
a Victorian. What he has found in Hopkins is at least one dimension that is
undoubtedly present at the center of his work and that helps to relate him to at
least some of the major problems confronting his age.
JOHN PICK

Marquette University
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Tragedy and Melodrama: Versions of Experience by Robert Bechtold Heilman.
Seatde: University of Washington Press, 1968. Pp. xiii + 326. $8.95.
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R. B. Heilman's handsome new volume, obviously the product of many years
of study and deliberation, may well be among the most important contributions
to the critical theory of dramatic literature to appear in our time; it is certainly
one which future writers in this field will find it impossible to ignore. The author
is exceedingly modest. He calls his work an "essay," an attempt simply to
explore ideas rather than to enunciate principles. Actually, he has set out to
define more precisely than ever before the genres of tragedy and melodrama.
He has not, however, limited himself to literature, for he is concerned with
defining the tragic and melodramatic perspectives as two complementary and
ever present ways in which human beings always have examined the experience
of life, whether they be dramatists or not.
Tragedy as a literary genre Heilman would separate with finality from the
ordinary use of the term as a description of human disaster; melodrama he
would re-establish as a critical concept without derogatory implications, describing a wide range of non-tragic literature, including the literature of
disaster which has often been confused with tragedy, capable of expressing
triumph as well as despair, and offering a vehicle for the highest kind of artistic
expression. Tragedy and melodrama he sees as each fulfilling basic human needs,
each with a validity distinctly its own, and he would oppose the critical tendency to confuse the properties of the two, for "if the former [tragedy] has
been cheapened by being applied where the latter [melodrama] is fitting, both
have been debased by being used for much less exacting experiences than
those which they properly denote and for which we lack other terms" (p. 286).
To demonstrate the many facets of each of these genres Heilman ranges over
all of the world's dramatic literature, and he draws upon the novel as well.
It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to the range and complexity of
his arguments; but, in brief, Heilman sees the essential difference between
tragedy and melodrama in the nature of their protagonists. Tragedy is marked by
U division"
in the character of the hero, and melodrama by "wholeness."
Whether melodrama end in triumph or in death, its essential structure calls for
a self-sufficient, unified force pitted against some kind of obstacle which it may
overcome or by which it may be destroyed. Man may struggle against nature,
society, evil political institutions, other evil men, or even against elements within
himself. One of the highest achievements of melodrama Heilman sees as
Webster's Duchess of Malji, which he describes as a play about a force of pure
innocence, without inner conflict, destroyed by pure malignancy-a play of unmitigated disaster, but not a tragedy because the Duchess has had no share in
her own destruction.
Melodrama involves no difficult choices for the hero, and it need not reveal
suffering as accompanied by growth in knowledge or understanding. Tragedy,
on the other hand, must have an intelligent hero who is forced to choose benveen
alternative commitments, but no choice that he is capable of making can at the
same time both resolve his problems and insure his moral fullness as a human
being; he cannot achieve felicity without losing some element of his manhood,
although that choice is always open to him: Hamlet might have decided to
forget about his father and accept the good life under Claudius, or Cordelia
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might have chosen to sacrifice her own integrity so as to humor her foolish
father. The destruction of such a tragic hero is accompanied by his acquisition of

new insight into his own nature as a human being and into the universal human
condition. "Every tragic choice," writes Heilman, "is both an affirmation of
self and a suicide" (p. 15), and the human condition can never be a subject
for despair. Tragedy is essentially optimistic because "in tragedy, life may Of
may not be cut off, but death, if it comes, is a lesser event than the new growth
of the hero" (p. 154).
In making this crucial point Heilman has performed an especially valuable
service at this time, for the tendency to equate tragedy with a despairing view
of mankind has been a growing feature of recent dramatic criticism, especially
of Shakespeare. King Lear, for instance, has been seen as a. play about impotent
humanity suffering at the hands of brutal and capricious forces in a universe
without reason or order. For Heilman the play is a much more complex
experience in which, while we pity Lear in his suffering and are profoundly
moved by the horror which can so afHict a. fellow human being, "we do not
forget that Lear, under the dominion of the dark side of his being, has created
the storm himself. Profound pity for Lear as victim, yes, but also acknowledgment of the paradoxical presence of justice, and sense of irony-all are present
in a disturbing polypathic experience" (p. 89). Any play which depicts man
as the victim of incomprehensible external forces-and notably the "naturalistic
tragedy" of recent times-Heilman would call melodrama and not tragedy at
all. 'I Tragedy," he writes, "implies a kind of recovery. Tragedy is the idiom of
an imperfect humanity that remains capable of moral recuperation; tragedy
implies a durable order of life, in which failure is always possible, but in which
it is understood, not mistaken for a final blow, the road to nothing. In tragedy
there is spiritual survival" (p. 154).
Heilman argues that when an artist faced with a story of human suffering
treats it from the viewpoint of the doer of evil he writes tragedy, but when he
treats it from the viewpoint of the victim of evil he writes melodrama. The
tragic perspective is thus a difficult and painful one, for it forces us to look for
the sources of evil within ourselves, and it calls for the exercise of all of our
powers of self analysis. The melodramatic perspective is easier and more natural,
for it allows us to assert our entire beings in opposition to external forces. It is
a complementary kind of experience to the tragic, and both must be experienced by the full man.
Heilman thus establishes the crucial importance of melodrama in all human
experience, and he extends its range far beyond what most of us have habitually
understood by the term. He makes the dramatic genre include such plays as
Miller's Deatb of a Salesman, O'Neill's Long Day's Journey Into Night, virtually
all drama of social, economic, or political protest, and what many of us have long
considered to be among the greatest of Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedies:
Edward II, The Spanish Tragedy, Bussy D'Ambois, Tbe Revenger's Tragedy,
Tbe Wbite Devil, Tbe Cbangeling, 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, although he admits
that some of these contain elements which border closely upon the tragic. It is
here that the strongest objection may be taken by some readers, for in this
extension of melodrama there is a diminishing of the possibilities of tragedy
which may be disturbing.
Even on the basis of Heilman's own criteria, it is possible to argue that The
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Duchess of Malfi, for instance, is not melodrama but tragedy. The Duchess is
faced with a choice between her natural human love for Antonio and the moral
and social imperative that she not marry beneath her social station. Tllls is a
division not essentially different from that of a Hamlet torn by the human
impulse to avenge his father in opposition to the divine injunction against such
conduct, or that of a Faustus whose human need to pursue forbidden Imowledge
runs counter to the threat of damnation. The social context of the Duchess'
defiance of her brothers-a major issue in the play's source-is not considered by
Heihnan so fully as it is by other critics (M. C. Bradbrook, for instance), who
see her as a less innocent figure. If she, like Lear, brings evil upon herself by
her own choice, she also grows in the same manner under the pressure of
disaster, and she attains a kind of victory in spite of death which affirms the
greatness of the human spirit and thus rescues the play from despair. If the
tragic experience leads to a heightened awareness of the potentialities of mankind, this is certainly achieved in The Duchess of Malfi. In the heroine's choice
of suffering and death rather than renunciation of her full humanity there is a
heroic quality which is also an ingredient of tragedy, and to which Heilman
pays too little attention.
Heilman's generic distinctions are highly speculative, and they will doubtless
be the subject of considerable debate (nor is it likely that he would expect
or wish the situation to be othenvisc). Tragedy has meant different things
to different people in different ages, and to different individuals within the same
historical period. Heilman is not concerned with historical development, although
he does devote one hrge chapter to measuring his definitions within the historical
context of English Renaissance drama. But in determining what tragedy is, can
we ignore what tragedy has been? Heilman calls Ben Jonson's Sejanus "a
political melodrama without a touch of the tragic" (p. 192), but Jonson himself
defended the playas precisely what his contemporary critics would define as
tragedy, and we cannot merely dismiss Jonson with the thought that his
conception of literary genres was less valid than our own. The Persians of
lEschylus, whose tragic power Heilman denies, was in fact an important classical
model for tragedy among Renaissance theorists who regarded its historical
subject matter as a crucial ingredient of tragedy not present in the Oresteia.
As an exploration of man's relation to the evils of the world and those within
himself, tragedy has always depended upon the assumptions about the world
and about human nature held in the specific eras of its creation. The supreme
tragedies were for many centuries considered to have been the fall of Lucifer
and the crucifixion of Christ, and the tragic power of literary works could be
measured by the extent to which they might be analogous to these cataclysmic
disasters. Neither could be considered a tragedy in Heilman's frame of reference;
since they involve protagonists totally evil or totally good, they must be classed
as melodrama. It may well be that the kind of tragedy which emerged in
ancient Greece could not be created either in the Christian Renaissance or in
our own age of skepticism and spiritual malaise. A truly satisfying conception
of the genre may have to find room for all of its historical variations.
Many will object that Heilman confines tragedy too narrowly within individual character, morc a nineteenth century concern than it had been in earlier
times, when the individual was considered worth examination only as a symbol
of the universal state of mankind. There is a long tradition of tragic writing,

308

BOOK REVIEWS

stemming from the medieval morality play and de casibus narrative which must
be viewed in these terms. A criterion for tragedy based entirely upon character which finds The Maid's Tragedy and A Woman Killed Witb Kindness more
truly tragic in structure than Tbe Duchess of Malli Of The White Devil (although
imperfect as tragedies because of other limitations) may be entirely too narrow
for our needs. A limiting of tragedy to struggle within the soul of individual
man may do little justice to the crucial political dimensions of plays like Julius
Caesa1' and Coriolanus (neither of which Heilman sees as fully tragic), and it
does cause Heilman to slight the tragic power of Ricbard II, where Richard's
suffering is not merely aroused by the injuries he has sustained but springs also
from a tragic awareness of his own violation of the responsibility placed upon
a lang by God.
What Heilman defines as tragedy will be accepted as such by most intelligent
readers. They may regard it, however, as merely one kind of tragedy. They may
argue that H a17llet may be a tragedy about a victim of evil who learns to overcome evil, just as Macbeth may be a tragedy about a doer of evil who is
destroyed by what he has created, and that it is the final effect upon the
audience, rather than the extent of the protagonist's guilt, which finally determines whether a work may be called a tragedy. The innocent no less than the
guilty may be subject to moral conflict and impossible choice. If the effect of
tragedy is a heightened awareness and understanding of the general human condition and an insight into the infinite complexity and contradiction of human
life, many readers will argue that these ends have been achieved by works other
than those that Heilman would describe as tragedy, including many which he
would call melodrama. He might well reply that the line of separation between
these two "versions of experience" must finally be drawn by each. man for
himself.
IRVING RIBNER

State University of New York
at Stony Brook.

The Lonely Labyrintb: Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works by Josiah Thompson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967. Pp. 242. $8.50.
Following his own lead, most of Kierkegaard's commentators have sought the
single" point of view" from which his works might be understood and evaluated.
Josiah Thompson's new book continues this tradition.
The Lonely Labyrinth elaborates the suggestion that "IGerkegaard was a
profoundly sick man, and that the character of his sickness established a privileged
perspective for the understanding of his work." In the light of this thesis, his
"works tum out to be, not abstruse theologico-philosophical treatises or mysterious aesthetic essays, but successive moves in a complicated dialectic of therapy."
(p. xiii) They are" efforts ... to find not trutb but health." (p. 16) Part One
of Thompson's book sketches the biographical, psychological, philosophical, and
literary background of Kierkegaard's authorship. Part Two-the major division
of the book-offers more or less detailed readings of the pseudonymous works
from Eitber/Or through Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
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Thompson's thesis has its virtues (of which more in a moment), but it also
raises a number of questions. A nation's concern with its own health presumably
justifies another painstaking reconstruction of six fatal seconds in Dallas. But
if Kierkegaard was a sick man who wrote books to cure himself, why should lOf anyone-be interested in the diagnosis or the treatment? Thompson's answer
seems to be that Kierkegaard's disease is endemic to all of us. He suffered from
consciousness itself, more specifically from the "fissure between self and world
which consciousness requires." (p. 46)
It is by no means obvious that the subject-object distinction is or engenders a
universal human affliction. It may be only a modern fad, the "existential" sickness, just as consumption used to be the "romantic way to die. There have
been generations of men who did not literally suffer their consciousness. Even
IGerkegaard allows that there is a healthy condition of consciousness and (pace
Thompson's etymology, p. 13) a bappy passion of reason, the condition and the
passion of faith. 1
But let that pass. Suppose consciousness is a universal disease. Thompson
insists that "IGerkegaard is finally uninterested in the formal characteristics of
any dialectic that might be extracted from his authorship . . . . He is no verbal
architect constructing an edifice of language to encapsulate the real, but a
suffering human being searching desperately for health." (p. 208) If this was his
purpose, why did he write, polish, and publish a whole shelf of books? He did
in fact go out of his way to construct a "verbal edifice" built in accordance
with a meticulously thought-olit literary dialectic. Yet if his only object was
therapy, surely the infonnal journals would have sufficed. Thompson's thesis
maI{cs irrelevant Kierkegaard's life-long preoccupation with the dialectics of
communication, his labors over the production of his books, and his careful
attention to the details of their publication.
My criticism is not directed against Thompson's thesis in particular. His
approach to IGerkegaard is a welcome relief from the usual clerical exegeses that
try to put Kierkegaard into one or another religious camp (radical Protestant,
covert Catholic, or~most recently Jl~a sneaky kind of Dunker). It permits him,
for example, to discern the essential perversity in Kierkegaard's late writings,
where most theological interpreters are committed to finding the soul of Christian
piety. And within the limits of his thesis he has done some of the most original
and sensitive readings of the pseudonymous works to date. He is alert to the
symbolic and archetypal values of IGerkegaard's books as few Kierkegaardians
have been. Many of his interpretations depend, often successfully (though
occasionally less so because of inattention to context), on minute analysis of
linguistic and stylistic features of the works. At his best he reads the works,
whereas most commentators read at them. For its treatment of individual works
and passages, and quite apart from its overall thesis, Thompson's book (the
cliche is inevitable) deserves to be read by every serious student of Kierkegaard.
Yet the thesis does limit Thompson's openness to IGerkegaard. It obliges him,
for example, to confound the pseudonyms with each other and with the author
1)

1 S¢ren Kierkegaard, Tbe Sickness Unto Death (New York, 1954), pp. 147,262;
Philosophical Fragments (Princeton, 1962), p. 67.
2 Vernard Eller, Kiel'kegaard
and Radical Disciplesbip: A New Perspective.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
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of the Edifying Discourses (cf. pp. 110, 112, 116), and to undervalue the literary
and philosophical plenitude of the pseudonymous works (cf. pp. 73, 150, 151).
Ex bypotbese the pseudonyms are projections of Kierkegaard, and the works,
for all their apparent variety, are so many tactics in a single strategy of selftreatment. There is one author, one problem, and one book written many times
in diverse manners. (pp. 19, 164)
The inseparability of form and content, a commonplace of modem criticism,
was a matter to which Kierkegaard gave much thought. He saw himself as a
philosopher and a poet, a philosopher only insofar as he was a poet; in all his
writings he strove to make the form "reduplicate" the content. a How it is possible to rewrite" the same book in different ways" (p. 164) is no clearer to me
than it was to Kierkegaard. But the point is essential to Thompson's argument;
as his book progresses we get more schematism (works appear from Klerkegaard's
pen to illustrate and confirm Thompson's thesis) and less reading of the worI{s
themselves. Kierkegaard may have been a sick man. But he was also a morethan-usually self-conscious literary artist. His artistry deserves to be honored
for itself, not merely as an incident in his therapy.
The issue, I repeat, is not Thompson's thesis in particular. As theses go, it is
as good as many and better than most. My criticism is more general: Thompson's book gives us a new point of view on Kierkegaard, but what is needed in
IGerkegaard literature is precisely not another point of view, new or old. If you
come to Kierkegaard's works with a point of view, you inevitably read not the
works but the reflection in them of your own determinations. Kierkegaard called
himself" a peculiar kind of poet and thinker." 4 Anyone who will read his works
aright must read them thoughtfully and poetically. The student of Kierkegaard
must endeavor to understand with imaginative impartiality all the points of view
expressed by all the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms and by Kierkegaard himself in
propria persona, each in its own right and for its own sake. Each is one perspective (a bias, in fact) on the many-faceted whole of human life; none is
the simple and entire truth. Not even the optimum statement of his views, which
Kierkegaard gave direcdy and without guile in the Edifying Discourses, exhausts the possibilities for human self-understanding or offers the reader a
decision ready-made for his case. The works are possibilities which the reader
must appropriate imaginatively in order to corne at last and passionately to his
own personal actuality That is part of what IGerkegaard meant when he said
that he had no opinions of his own, no advice to tender, and no relationship to
his own works save that of a reader.
Kierkegaard was a poet because he was a man of almost unlimited negative
capability, so much so that (Thompson is right about this) it nearly drove him
mad. He demands of his reader, not the infallible point of view, but the capacity
to cultivate multiple perspectives, a capacity that poetry requires and which in
turn the study of poetry can help to develop. There may be, as Thompson
says, "no deep secret concerning IGerkegaard's use of pseudonyms" (p. 73),
:I

IGerkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton, 1941), pp. 67-74,

312-322.

41bid., "A First and Last Declaration," (unpaged = p. 554); also IGerkegaard,
Preface to "Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! (Princeton, 1944), p. 5.
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but there is an important literary and philosophical truth behind it. IGerkegaard
understood that angelic objectivity is not available to finite minds. Every human
being is more than a little prejudiced, and no man can hope to disarm all his
presuppositions. In such a predicament, the closest approximation to objectivity
is poetry. By enlarging lUs imaginative sympathies, by cultivating as many
perspectives as he can, a man is less likely to be the victim of his own idiosyncratic bias. We cannot tell it like it is, we can only tell the many ways it
might be. The profusion of metaphor is the best we get this side of the Beatific
Vision. That was the point in Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms. Truth is bigger
than any or all of Qur lopsided little truths. Best, therefore, not to chase some
will-o-the-wisp of literal objectivity; better exploit all the options than be the
slave of one. That kind of subjectivity is truth.
Fashions in criticism come and go, but no student of . literature believes that
he must decide II for," say, Donne, and" against," say, Keats. Both the metaphysical and the romantic are viable and valuable modes of imagining. Yet
philosophers have, at least since Descartes, been hung on the over-simple
dichotomy of True and False. If you are with Kant, you must be against Aquinas.
Kierkegaard's gift to philosophy was the recognition that philosophical thought
is not the firming up of Absolute Truth, but the imaginative exploration of the
possible toward the enrichment of human self-understanding and the enabling
of human decision. In other words, poetry. His own works demand to be read
as a peculiar kind of dramatic poetry, of which the ultimate author has created
not only the characters but the very poets. To read them from a new point
of view, however cleverly devised and heavily documented (Kierkegaard like
the Bible can be quoted on behalf of any interpretation), will of course turn
up new aspects of their meaning. But it will also, by depreciating the medium,
deface the message. To read them without a point of view, or (which is the
same thing) from all the points of view they themselves suggest, is, like the
criticism of literature, an unending task. But that was exactly what their author
had in mind, whose declared intent was not to propose a new system of philosophy nor to contrive new techniques for self-therapy, but "to read solo
the original text of the individual human existence-relationship, the old text,
well known, handed down from the fathers-to read it through yet once more,
if possible in a more heartfelt way." Ii
LOUIS
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